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ABSTRACT: The Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 explicitly increased Medicare payments to private Medicare Advantage (MA) plans. As a result, every MA plan in the nation
is paid more for its enrollees than they would have been expected to cost in traditional feefor-service Medicare. The authors calculate that payments to MA plans in 2008 will be 12.4
percent greater than the corresponding costs in traditional Medicare—an average increase
of $986 per MA plan enrollee, for a total of more than $8.5 billion. Over the five-year
period 2004–2008, extra payments to MA plans are estimated to have totaled nearly $33
billion. Although Congress recently enacted modest reductions in MA plan payments,
these changes will not take effect until 2010. Moreover, while the new legislation removes
a few factors contributing to the extra payments, a number of other factors remain unaffected.
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The Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) included a broad set of provisions intended to expand the role of private health plans in Medicare. Included
among these were new payment policies that increased payments to private
health plans.
The higher level of payments for Medicare Advantage (MA) plans—as
these private plans are now called—was based on a belief that, following an
upfront investment to stabilize plan participation and increase beneficiary enrollment, “private plans and competition will help drive down the explosive growth
of Medicare spending.”1 However, in each of the five years from 2004 through
2008, MMA policies have resulted in payments to MA plans that have substantially exceeded comparable costs in traditional fee-for-service Medicare.
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The analysis in this paper uses the latest (2008)
data on actual enrollment in MA plans and on MA
benchmark payment rates to estimate the extra payments made to MA plans relative to what the same
enrollees would have cost under traditional Medicare.
Based on this information, we calculate that
payments to MA plans in 2008 exceed local fee-forservice costs by 12.4 percent, or an average of $986
for each of the 8.7 million Medicare enrollees in
managed care,2 for a national total of more than $8.5
billion.3 Over the five-year period 2004–2008, extra
payments to MA plans are estimated to have totaled
nearly $33 billion.4
In the recent Medicare Improvements for
Patients and Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA), the
Congress made modest reductions in payments to MA
plans, which take effect in 2010. If these reductions
had been in effect in 2008, MA plan payments still
would have exceeded fee-for-service costs by 10.6
percent. This paper focuses on payments in 2008,
which were unaffected by the MIPPA legislation.

Background: Medicare and
Private Plans
The participation of private health plans in Medicare is
not new. Prepaid group practice plans, the early form
of health maintenance organizations (HMOs), have
been part of Medicare since its inception in 1966.
Moreover, the first major set of Medicare amendments
in 1972 created a program under which HMOs would
receive prepayment for providing coordinated care to
Medicare beneficiaries.
In 1982, the Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act gave HMOs the opportunity to be
paid on a risk basis, at 95 percent of average per capita
fee-for-service costs, in each county. HMOs were
expected to be more efficient than the traditional program, saving the government 5 percent on expected
costs for each enrollee while offering additional benefits—in the form of lower out-of-pocket payments or
benefits not covered by traditional Medicare.5
During the 1990s, Medicare beneficiary enrollment in these risk plans (called “Medicare+Choice”

plans) grew rapidly—from 1.3 million to 5.2 million,
or 3.7 percent of beneficiaries to 13.5 percent, between
1990 and 1997.6 This rapid growth was fueled by the
additional benefits that these plans were able to provide: in 1996, risk plans provided an average of $924
per member annually in additional benefits.7 But the
availability of these benefits was not uniform across
the country, being highly correlated with the payment
rate in each area. The 10 percent of risk plans with the
highest payment rates (29 percent higher than the
nationwide average, adjusted for local input costs)
offered additional benefits worth an average of $1,452
annually, while the 10 percent of plans with the lowest
payment rates (25 percent below the nationwide average) offered extra benefits worth only $576 annually.8
Moreover, because Medicare risk plans—and
therefore enrollment in those plans—tended to be concentrated in certain areas, so was the availability of
additional benefits. In the era before prescription-drug
coverage was available to all Medicare beneficiaries,
this distribution caused particular concern. In effect,
beneficiaries in some areas with relatively high payment rates and high risk-plan penetration had access to
a prescription-drug benefit—funded by Medicare payments—while beneficiaries in other areas (including
many rural areas) did not.
Elimination of this inequity was one objective
of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA), which for
the first time set Medicare payments to private plans in
some areas at a higher level than average fee-forservice costs. It did this by establishing both a nationwide minimum payment rate, or floor, and a blended
rate based on a combination of each area’s own average costs and the nationwide average. These provisions benefited plans in rural and other relatively lowcost areas. In 2001, the Medicare, Medicaid, and
SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of
2000 expanded the policy of paying private plans more
than average fee-for-service costs by setting a new
higher floor for private plans in large urban areas.9
Following the enactment of the BBA in 1997,
the Congressional Budget Office predicted that 27 percent of Medicare beneficiaries would be enrolled in
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private plans by 2002.10 But after peaking in 1999 at
16 percent of beneficiaries nationwide, Medicare
Choice (M+C) plan enrollment declined to 12 percent
in 2003 (Figure 1). This was largely due to the fact
that, in addition to changing the way in which payment rates were determined, the BBA also reduced the
overall increase in payments for fee-for-service
Medicare and, consequently, to M+C plans. Results
included the withdrawal of plans from many areas and
a reduction in the benefits offered to private-plan
enrollees. This decline helped spur creation of the
Medicare Advantage program in 2003, which further
increased MA payments and expanded the types of private plans available for Medicare beneficiaries.
Figure 1. Enrollment in Medicare Managed Care Plans
as a Percentage of Total Medicare Beneficiaries, 1995–2008
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•

A minimum rate (or floor) for large urban areas
(areas with populations of more than 250,000),
which in 2008 is set at $9,499 per enrollee
annually.

•

A minimum rate (or floor) for rural and smaller
urban areas, which in 2008 is set at $8,595
annually.

•

A blended rate, which is a 50/50 combination of
the base Medicare Advantage rate for the
county in 2004 and the national average
Medicare Advantage rate in that year, updated
to 2008.11

•

A rate that reflects a minimum increase from
the county’s 2004 payment level, updated to
2008.12,13

•

A payment rate equal to 100 percent of estimated county per capita fee-for-service costs in
2004, updated to 2008.14

•

A payment rate equal to 100 percent of projected county per capita fee-for-service costs in
2005, updated to 2008.15

•

A payment rate equal to 100 percent of projected county per capita fee-for-service costs in
2007, updated to 2008.16

Source: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services managed care enrollment data—
data for 1995–2002 are as of December 1 of each year; data for 2003–2007 are for the
quarter ending in December of each year; data for 2008 are as of February 2008.

MA Plan Payments in 2008
Medicare payments to MA plans in 2008 are based on
four factors: (1) county benchmark rates specified by
the MMA; (2) a budget-neutral risk-adjustment
(BNRA) policy that increases the benchmarks by 1.7
percent in 2008; (3) the inclusion of the fee-for-service
payment adjustment for indirect medical education (IME)
costs in the benchmark rates; and (4) a plan-bidding
mechanism (described below) that reduces payments
by an average of 4.3 percent in 2008. Taken together,
these four policies result in extra payments to MA
plans that average $986 per MA plan enrollee per year,
for a national total of more than $8.5 billion in 2008.

3

The seven types of county benchmark rates are:
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County Benchmark Rates. For 2008, Medicare
benchmark rates for MA plans in each county are set
at the highest of seven different reference rates. The
first four of these are based on payment levels established
in March 2004, trended forward each year through
2008; the other three are based on fee-for-service costs
in a base year, trended forward to 2008.
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On average, county benchmarks exceed
average fee-for-service costs in 2008 by 16.7 percent.
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Budget-Neutral Risk-Adjustment (BNRA) Policy.
The BNRA policy, in effect since 2003, has increased
MA plan payments across-the-board so that aggregate
MA plan payments are less affected by the implementation of an improved risk-adjustment mechanism that
adjusts benchmark rates to account for variation in
enrollees’ health status and clinical conditions. The
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 provided for a phaseout of this increase in MA benchmark rates from 2006
through 2010. In 2008, the BNRA policy increases all
county benchmarks by 1.7 percent, adding approximately $1.3 billion to MA payments.17
Payment for Indirect Medicare Education Included
in the Benchmarks. An explicit policy included in
the MMA provides that the MA benchmark payment
rate for each county includes an amount that reflects
Medicare payments to teaching hospitals for their indirect medical education (IME) costs. This sum is
included in the MA county benchmarks, despite the
fact that Medicare makes IME payments directly to
teaching hospitals for MA enrollees admitted to these
hospitals. Medicare therefore effectively pays twice for
the IME costs of MA plan members.18 This double
payment raises the MA benchmark rates by about 2.3
percent, and MA payments by an estimated $1.7 billion. The recent MIPPA legislation removes this component of MA payment rates beginning in 2010.
In an arrangement similar to the additional payments that teaching hospitals receive from Medicare
for their IME costs, hospitals that treat a disproportionate share of indigent patients receive a disproportionate share hospital (DSH) payment for patients in
traditional fee-for-service Medicare. Unlike IME payments, however, Medicare DSH payments are included
in the monthly capitation payment rates that plans
receive, but not made directly to hospitals; it is left to
each plan to determine how much of the DSH amount,
if any, it will pay to each institution. Medicare DSH
payments are not in general related to the costs faced
by individual plans, and an argument could be made
that they, like IME payments, should be paid directly
to eligible hospitals for the MA patients they treat.
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Because a good estimate is not available for the
county-level effect of DSH payments on MA payments, they are not included in the calculations in this
analysis. But they could be considered as representing
additional overpayments to MA plans.
MA Plan Bidding System. Under the bidding mechanism established by the MMA, all MA plans submit
bids for the provision of traditional Medicare benefits
to their enrollees. MA plans then receive payments
equal to the applicable benchmark rate for the county
in which each enrollee resides minus 25 percent of the
difference between the county benchmark and each
individual plan’s bid. Plan bids for 2008 were an average of 17 percent below their county benchmarks,
according to Medicare Payment Advisory Commission
staff analysis.19 This implies that MA plan payments
are, on average, 4.3 percent (25 percent of 17 percent)
below their corresponding benchmarks; since the
benchmarks themselves are 16.7 percent above fee-forservice costs, on average, MA plan payments are 12.4
percent (16.7 percent minus 4.3 percent) above feefor-service costs.

Variation in Extra Payments in 2008
The overall pattern of Medicare extra payments to MA
plans in 2008 may be described by focusing on plans
located in three types of areas.
•

“Large urban floor” counties. The largest
aggregate amount of extra payments goes to
MA plans in the counties in which the large
urban floor benchmark determines the MA payment rates. The extra payments received by MA
plans in these counties amount to approximately
$3.8 billion, or 44 percent of the $8.5 billion in
total extra payments in 2008. Extra payments to
plans in these counties are estimated to average
$1,478 (or 20 percent) more per plan enrollee
than the same person would be expected to cost
under traditional Medicare fee-for-service.
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“100 percent of fee-for-service” counties. In the
counties where MA payments are determined by
the 100 percent of fee-for-service benchmark,
total extra payments are estimated at over $2.6
billion, accounting for 30.6 percent of total
extra payments nationwide.
This seemingly anomalous finding—payments
based on 100 percent of fee-for-service costs
actually exceeding fee-for-service costs—is the
result of the three policies described above,
which actually overstate MA payments relative
to patient care costs under traditional Medicare.
First, the BNRA policy adds 1.7 percent to the
MA benchmarks in every county in 2008.
Second, the inclusion of the IME payment in
the MA benchmarks adds 2.3 percent, on average, to those benchmarks. Third, because the
MA rebasing policy sets new county benchmarks only higher than, and never less than, a
county’s previous year MA benchmark updated
to the current year, many plans paid at 100 percent of fee-for-service in an earlier year updated
to 2008 are paid more than the current average
of fee-for-service costs in the county in 2008.

•

Rural counties. Despite the initial concern over
low MA payment rates in rural counties, it
should be noted that MA extra payments do not
flow disproportionately to Medicare plans in
rural areas. While 17.9 percent of Medicare
beneficiaries live in counties where MA payment rates are determined by the rural floor
benchmark, only $1.1 billion (13 percent) of
MA extra payments will go to plans in these
counties in 2008.

Thirty-five years of national experience with
HMOs and managed care plans indicates that private
managed care plans have generally located and
attracted enrollees in urban areas. This pattern is
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evident both in commercial health insurance and
Medicare. After 10 years of rural floor payments in
excess of 100 percent of average fee-for-service costs,
fewer than 11 percent of Medicare beneficiaries in
rural counties are enrolled in MA plans in 2008, compared with 24 percent of beneficiaries in urban counties.
The distribution of MA extra payments and
enrollees by payment category is displayed in
Appendix Tables 1 and 2.

Variation in Extra Payments
by State in 2008
The amount of extra payments to MA plans in 2008
varies greatly by state (see Appendix Table 3). Extra
payments per enrollee in 2008 range from a maximum
of over $2,200 in New Mexico and Hawaii to a minimum of just $228 in Nevada. Notably, the states with
the greatest extra payments per MA enrollee are generally the ones with the lowest per capita fee-for-service
costs. While New Mexico’s are 20 percent below the
national average, Nevada’s are 6 percent above.
However, although this relationship might appear
to reduce the discrepancy between high- and low-cost
states, it actually provides a perverse incentive for
beneficiaries in states with low fee-for-service costs to
leave traditional Medicare while failing to provide the
same attractive alternative for beneficiaries in states
with high fee-for-service costs. Plans in states where
costs are already low thus are disproportionately
rewarded by these extra payments, compared with plans
in high-cost states—where more competition might be
expected to bring those high costs down.
Moreover, the total amount of extra payments to
MA plans is highly concentrated among a relatively
small number of states. In 2005, California and New
York alone accounted for about one-fourth of total
extra payments, and more than half went to plans in
six states. By contrast, the 30 states with the lowest
total extra payments together accounted for just 15
percent of those payments.
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MA Plan Payments Since 2003

Figure 3. Trends in Average Extra Payment per MA Plan
Enrollee, 2004–2008
$1,500
Average Extra Payment
per MA Plan Enrollee

MA payment rates were increased by the MMA beginning in March 2004. Since that time, MA payment
benchmarks—and Medicare payments generally—
have exceeded costs of fee-for-service Medicare for
every plan in every county in the nation. The effect of
these provisions has been to increase total extra payments from $3.9 billion in 2004 to $8.5 billion in 2008
(Figure 2), with a cumulative five-year cost of nearly
$33 billion.
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Total extra payments have increased both
because of growth in the amount of extra payments per
MA plan enrollee and growth in the total number of
enrollees. Extra payments per enrollee were $795 (11.9
percent) above fee-for-service costs in 2004, rising to a
high of $1,037 (14.1 percent) above fee-for-service
costs in 2006, and then hitting $986 (12.4 percent)
above fee-for-service costs in 2008 (Figure 3). The
peak in 2006 mainly reflects the level of BNRA payments at 7.7 percent in 2006, 3.9 percent in 2007, and
1.7 percent in 2008. Meanwhile, the number of
Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in MA plans has
increased from 4.8 million to 8.6 million.

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has
attributed the increase in MA enrollment to the extra
payments received by MA plans. In 2007, prior to the
passage of MIPPA, CBO projected that a policy of
paying MA plans at 100 percent of fee-for-service
costs at the county level—that is, of eliminating the
extra payments—would reduce projected MA enrollment in 2012 from 12.5 million to 6.2 million
Medicare beneficiaries, a number only slightly higher
than MA enrollment in 2005.20 CBO also estimated
that the resulting reduction in Medicare spending
would total $54 billion over the four years from 2009
through 2012 and $149 billion over the nine years
from 2009 through 2017 (Figure 4).
Figure 4. Estimated Savings from the Implementation of a
Policy to Reduce Payments to MA Plans to
100 Percent of Fee-for-Service Costs, 2009–2017
$25
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Total Annual Extra Payments
to MA Plans (in Billions)

Figure 2. Trends in Total Extra Payments
to MA Plans, 2004–2008
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Source: Congressional Budget Office, June 2007.
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Conclusion
The MMA-driven policies that raised Medicare payments
to private plans have spurred greater enrollment in
those plans, but have substantially increased Medicare
costs. This is primarily due to extra payments—payments
in excess of fee-for-service costs—paid to private
plans by Medicare. In 2008, for each of the 8.6 million
Medicare enrollees in managed care, Medicare will
spend an average of $986, or 12.4 percent, more than
it would for comparable beneficiaries in traditional
fee-for-service Medicare, with total extra payments to
MA plans exceeding $8.5 billion.
There is wide variation in these extra payments across geographic areas: the average amount per
MA enrollee by state ranges from $228 (2.6 percent
above average fee-for-service costs) in Nevada to
$2,305 (35 percent above average fee-for-service
costs) in New Mexico. This variation indicates that the
availability of additional benefits—which was a major
objective of the policy changes in the MMA—is concentrated in some regions while remaining absent from
others. Moreover, the impact of these extra payments
on beneficiaries in many areas is questionable. For
example, counties where the rural floor applies contain
17.9 percent of total Medicare beneficiaries, but they
receive only 13 percent of extra payments because the
vast majority of their beneficiaries—87.4 percent—
remain in traditional Medicare.
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Extra payments to MA private plans have
increased Medicare costs by nearly $33 billion in the
five years since 2004. Prior to the enactment of
MIPPA in July 2008, MA extra payments were projected to add almost $150 billion to Medicare costs
over the next nine years. Moreover, overpayment of
private plans presents a threat to Medicare’s efficiency—contravening the original reason for including
a private plan option in Medicare.
These extra payments, which represent a drain
on the federal budget, could otherwise be used to
reduce the nation’s deficit or to offset the costs of
Medicare policy improvements. The latter could
involve, say, reducing Part B premiums, increasing eligibility for low-income subsidies in Medicare Part D,
or reducing Part D copayments. All of these alternatives represent broader or better-targeted benefits for
the Medicare dollars spent.
While MIPPA reduced the extra payments to
private plans, a substantial amount of those extra payments remain. The substantial cost of those extra payments, along with the potential distortion of incentives
in a program intended to improve efficiency, and the
large number of pressing needs to which those resources
might alternatively be applied all suggest that current
Medicare policies deserve continued examination.
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The BNRA payment policy, originally implemented
administratively but codified in the Deficit Reduction
Act (DRA) of 2005, adds about $1.3 billion to total extra
payments in 2008. This amount is less than the $1.8 billion that BNRA contributed to extra payments in 2005
(or roughly one-third of total extra payments in 2005).
When BNRA payment policy was formally recognized in
statute through the DRA, it included a schedule to phase
out the BNRA from 2006 through 2010.
To calculate the effect of these double payments on the
level of payments to MA plans, MedPAC and other analysts reduce the per capita fee-for-service costs in a
county by the per capita IME costs in the county. This is
done by deflating the county fee-for-service average by a
factor of 1–(0.65 x GME), where GME is the county
graduate medical education carve-out and 0.65 represents
the national average percentage of GME payments that
goes to indirect medical education (county-specific data
are unavailable). Because Medicare makes IME payments directly to teaching hospitals for patients who are
enrolled in Medicare Advantage, MA payment rates are
most appropriately compared with fee-for-service costs
adjusted in this manner. Medicare Payment Advisory
Commission, Report to the Congress: Medicare Payment
Policy (Washington, D.C.: MedPAC, Mar. 2002).
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Appendix Table 1. Extra Payments in 2008, by County Payment Category,
to Medicare Advantage Plans Relative to Average Fee-for-Service Costs1
Average Extra Payment for MA Plans2,3,7

Medicare
Beneficiaries5

MA Plan
Enrollees4

Total Annual
Extra Payments
to MA Plans
(millions)

42,986,173

8,666,615

$8,541

$986

12.4%

Rural Floor

7,677,075

968,106

1,114

1,151

16.4%

Urban Floor

11,346,652

2,572,212

3,802

1,478

20.0%

Blend

1,404,844

343,146

416

1,214

14.8%

Minimum Update

2,495,260

598,826

588

983

10.8%

100% FFS 20046

3,246,396

578,946

728

1,257

14.1%

100% FFS 20056

14,037,766

2,958,146

1,788

604

6.7%

100% FFS 20076

2,778,180

647,233

106

164

1.6%

County
Payment Type
National

Average Extra
Amount per MA
Plan Enrollee

Average Extra Payment
to MA Plans Greater
than FFS Costs

1

Calculations exclude payments to teaching hospitals for the IME expenses both of MA and fee-for-service (FFS) beneficiaries. Calculations include budget-neutral
risk adjustment of 1.0169.
2

Calculations at the county level, weighted by MA enrollment. Excludes MA enrollees in cost plans.

3

In 2006 and future years, the MMA provides that payments to MA plans change from a system based entirely on county benchmarks to one that combines county benchmarks
with a bid by each individual MA plan. The new benchmark-based bidding system allocates 75% of the difference between the county benchmark and the MA plan bid to the plan
and 25% to the federal government. Analysts at MedPAC who have studied Medicare private-plan payments and costs have found that the average MA plan bid is approximately
17% less than the county benchmark. This would result in a 4.25% reduction in benchmark extra payment rates to MA plans. The above calculations account for the fact that
average MA plan bids fall 17% below the 2007 MA benchmark rates. See: Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, “Special Needs Plans and an Update on the Medicare
Advantage Program,” MedPAC Public Meeting, Dec. 6, 2007 (Washington, D.C.: MedPAC, 2007).
4

Medicare Advantage enrollment data as of February 2008.

5

Medicare beneficiary totals as of December 2005.

6

CMS decided to rebase the 100% of FFS rate at the county level in 2005 and 2007. Rebasing the FFS rates means that CMS retabulated the per capita FFS expenditures
for each county so that the FFS rates reflected more recent county growth trends in FFS expenditures. The MMA provided that the county-level payment rate for MA plans in
2005 be the higher of the 2005 rebased 100% of FFS rate or the 2004 rate increased by 6.6%. See: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, “Note to Medicare Advantage
Organizations and Other Interested Parties: Advance Notice of Methodological Changes for Calendar Year (CY) 2005 Medicare Advantage Payment Rates” (Washington, D.C.:
CMS, Mar. 26, 2004), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Downloads/Advance2005.pdf, accessed Sept. 15, 2004.
For 2007, the county-level payment rate for MA plans was the higher of the 2007 rebased 100% of FFS rate or the 2006 rate increased by 7.1%. See: Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services, “Announcement of Calendar Year (CY) 2007 Medicare Advantage Capitation Rates and Medicare Advantage and Part D Payment Policies Fact Sheet”
(Washington, D.C.: CMS, Apr. 3, 2006), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Downloads/factsheet2007.pdf, accessed May 30, 2006.
7

For these calculations, 2007 FFS rates have been adjusted by 5.71% in accordance with the updated national estimates for 2008 on per capita MA growth percentage, released
by CMS on April 2, 2007. See: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, “Announcement of Calendar Year (CY) 2008 Medicare Advantage (MA) Capitation Rates and
Payment Policies” (Washington, D.C.: CMS, Apr. 2, 2007), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Downloads/Announcement2008.pdf.
Note: Calculations exclude Medicare beneficiaries and MA enrollees in Puerto Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
Source: George Washington University analysis of Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Medicare Managed Care State/County/Contract Data File, released February
2008; Medicare Managed Care Quarterly State, County Data File for the quarter ending December 2005; and the Medicare Advantage 2008 Rate Calculation Data Spreadsheet.
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Appendix Table 2. 2008 Distributions, by County Payment Category, of Medicare Beneficiaries,
Medicare Advantage Plan Enrollees, MA Enrollment Rates, and Extra Payments to MA Plans
Distribution
of Medicare
Beneficiaries

Distribution
of MA Plan
Enrollees

MA Plan
Enrollment Rate

Distribution
of MA Plan
Extra Payments

100.0%

100.0%

20.2%

100.0%

Rural Floor

17.9%

11.2%

12.6%

13.0%

Urban Floor

26.4%

29.7%

22.7%

44.5%

Blend

3.3%

4.0%

24.4%

4.9%

Minimum Update

5.8%

6.9%

24.2%

6.9%

100% FFS 20041

7.6%

6.7%

17.8%

8.5%

100% FFS 20051

32.7%

34.1%

21.1%

20.9%

100% FFS 20071

6.5%

7.5%

23.3%

1.2%

County
Payment Type
National

1

CMS decided to rebase the 100 percent of FFS rate at the county level in 2005 and 2007. Rebasing the FFS rates means that CMS retabulated the per capita FFS expenditures
for each county so that the FFS rates reflected more recent county growth trends in FFS expenditures. The MMA provided that the county-level payment rate for MA plans in
2005 be the higher of the 2005 rebased 100% of FFS rate or the 2004 rate increased by 6.6%. See: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, “Note to Medicare Advantage
Organizations and Other Interested Parties: Advance Notice of Methodological Changes for Calendar Year (CY) 2005 Medicare Advantage Payment Rates” (Washington, D.C.:
CMS, Mar. 26, 2004), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Downloads/Advance2005.pdf, accessed Sept. 15, 2004.
For 2007, the county level payment rate for MA plans was the higher of the 2007 rebased 100% of FFS rate or the 2006 rate increased by 7.1%. See: Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services, “Announcement of Calendar Year (CY) 2007 Medicare Advantage Capitation Rates and Medicare Advantage and Part D Payment Policies Fact Sheet”
(Washington, D.C.: CMS, Apr. 3, 2006), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Downloads/factsheet2007.pdf, accessed May 30, 2006.
Source: George Washington University analysis of Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Medicare Managed Care State/County/Contract data file released February 2008;
Medicare Managed Care Quarterly State, County Data File for the quarter ending December 2005; and the Medicare Advantage 2008 Rate Calculation Data Spreadsheet.
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Appendix Table 3. Extra Payments to Medicare Advantage Plans in 2008 Compared
with Average Fee-for-Service Costs, by State1
Average MA Plan Payment
Greater than FFS Costs2,3,6
Average
Extra
Amount
per
MA Plan
Enrollee

Total Extra
Payments
to MA Plans
(millions)

Average Extra
Payment to MA
Plans Greater
than FFS Costs

State

Medicare
Beneficiaries5

MA Plan
Enrollees4

MA Plan
Enrollment
Rate

National

42,986,173

8,666,615

20.2%

$986

$8,541

12.4%

Rural

12,692,302

1,399,716

11.0%

889

1,244

12.3%

Urban

30,293,871

7,266,899

24.0%

1,004

7,297

12.5%

781,601

126,308

16.2%

841

106

10.1%

Alaska

45,701

88

0.2%

715

0.1

8.3%

Arizona

818,639

300,985

36.8%

1,090

328

13.8%

Arkansas

489,388

53,296

10.9%

1,017

54

13.7%

California

4,386,037

1,458,679

33.3%

902

1,315

10.8%

Colorado

542,294

153,331

28.3%

891

137

11.1%

Connecticut

540,699

67,423

12.5%

459

31

5.3%

Delaware

132,269

4,106

3.1%

596

2

7.1%

77,597

2,034

2.6%

1,466

3

16.1%

Florida

3,129,832

819,793

26.2%

279

229

3.4%

Georgia

1,076,986

128,138

11.9%

1,096

140

14.1%

Hawaii

189,271

31,247

16.5%

2,265

71

34.1%

Idaho

198,714

45,573

22.9%

1,289

59

17.5%

Illinois

1,749,064

143,742

8.2%

721

104

9.3%

Indiana

934,910

91,109

9.7%

1,290

118

17.4%

Iowa

502,547

46,763

9.3%

1,548

72

22.7%

Kansas

412,026

30,900

7.5%

993

31

12.4%

Kentucky

704,727

82,838

11.8%

917

76

11.9%

Louisiana

642,618

123,277

19.2%

1,275

157

12.9%

Maine

243,190

10,499

4.3%

1,540

16

21.7%

Alabama

D.C.

Maryland

718,389

30,002

4.2%

398

12

4.2%

Massachusetts

1,007,212

180,488

17.9%

877

158

9.9%

Michigan

1,537,840

311,878

20.3%

763

238

9.6%

Minnesota

721,521

161,166

22.3%

814

131

10.9%

Mississippi

471,940

33,977

7.2%

919

31

11.1%

Missouri

942,794

162,321

17.2%

1,059

172

13.5%

Montana

153,286

20,596

13.4%

966

20

13.4%

Nebraska

267,836

24,611

9.2%

950

23

12.4%

Nevada

308,802

97,351

31.5%

228

22

2.6%

New Hampshire

194,363

6,851

3.5%

1,105

8

14.1%

New Jersey

1,270,110

119,500

9.4%

361

43

3.9%

New Mexico

277,591

62,588

22.5%

2,305

144

35.0%

2,879,429

726,156

25.2%

1,123

816

14.0%

New York
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Average MA Plan Payment
Greater than FFS Costs2,3,6

State
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio

Medicare
Beneficiaries5

MA Plan
Enrollees4

MA Plan
Enrollment
Rate

Average
Extra
Amount
per
MA Plan
Enrollee

Total Extra
Payments
to MA Plans
(millions)

Average Extra
Payment to MA
Plans Greater
than FFS Costs

1,318,782

206,710

15.7%

1,510

312

20.6%

106,313

5,902

5.6%

1,184

7

16.9%

1,811,669

419,685

23.2%

1,084

455

13.8%

Oklahoma

559,862

71,050

12.7%

691

49

8.1%

Oregon

557,661

221,939

39.8%

1,708

379

25.3%

Pennsylvania

2,189,492

735,739

33.6%

831

612

10.1%

Rhode Island

177,579

62,121

35.0%

1,449

90

18.9%

South Carolina

673,878

82,596

12.3%

1,065

88

13.8%

South Dakota

128,623

10,122

7.9%

1,207

12

17.5%

Tennessee

955,071

186,123

19.5%

1,031

192

13.3%

2,641,789

409,991

15.5%

1,482

607

15.7%

Utah

245,106

62,275

25.4%

1,416

88

19.1%

Vermont

100,351

2,189

2.2%

1,167

3

16.5%

1,023,393

98,115

9.6%

1,628

160

23.0%

Washington

851,609

184,789

21.7%

1,477

273

20.0%

West Virginia

367,440

64,604

17.6%

1,045

68

14.0%

Wisconsin

854,772

182,931

21.4%

1,520

278

21.7%

Wyoming

73,560

2,120

2.9%

649

1

8.7%

Texas

Virginia

1

Calculations exclude payments to teaching hospitals for the IME expenses both of MA and FFS beneficiaries.

2

Calculations at the county level, weighted by MA enrollment. Excludes MA enrollees in cost plans. Calculations include budget neutral risk adjustment of 1.0169.

3

In 2006 and future years, the MMA provides that payments to MA plans change from a system based entirely on county benchmarks to one that combines county benchmarks
with a bid by each individual MA plan. The new benchmark-based bidding system allocates 75% of the difference between the county benchmark and the MA plan bid to the plan
and 25% to the federal government. Analysts at MedPAC who have studied Medicare private-plan payments and costs have found that the average MA plan bid is approximately
17% less than the county benchmark. This would result in a 4.25% reduction in benchmark extra payment rates to MA plans. The above calculations account for the fact that
average MA plan bids fall 17% below the 2007 MA benchmark rates. See: Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, “Special Needs Plans and an Update on the Medicare
Advantage Program,” MedPAC Public Meeting, Dec. 6, 2007 (Washington, D.C.: MedPAC, 2007).
4

Medicare Advantage enrollment data as of February 2008.

5

Medicare beneficiary totals as of December 2005.

6

For these calculations, 2007 FFS rates have been adjusted by 5.71% in accordance with the updated national estimates for 2008 on per capita MA growth percentage estimates
for 2008, released by CMS on April 2, 2007. See: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, “Announcement of Calendar Year (CY) 2008 Medicare Advantage (MA) Capitation
Rates and Payment Policies” (Washington, D.C.: CMS, Apr. 2, 2007), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Downloads/Announcement2008.pdf.
Source: George Washington University analysis of Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Medicare Managed Care State/County/Contract Data File released February
2008; Medicare Managed Care Quarterly State, County Data File for the quarter ending December 2005; and the Medicare Advantage 2008 Rate Calculation Data Spreadsheet.
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S tudy M ethods
This report’s 2008 analysis is based on Medicare Advantage payment rates and fee-for-service expenditure averages posted by county in the 2008 CMS Medicare Advantage Rate Calculation Data spreadsheet.i The number
of Medicare Advantage enrollees by county is taken from the CMS State/County/Contract data file for February
2008. The number of Medicare beneficiaries by county is taken from the Medicare Managed Care Quarterly
State County data file for the quarter ending December 2005. These data are posted on the Website of the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, http://www.cms.hhs.gov.ii
The county is the basic unit of analysis, as Medicare sets MA plan payment rates at the county level. For 2008,
Medicare benchmark rates for MA plans in each county are set at the highest of seven different reference points:
a floor rate for counties in large urban areas; a floor rate for other counties; a blended rate (consisting of 50 percent of the county-specific base MA payment rate and 50 percent of the national average base MA payment
rate); a minimum update over the previous year’s payment rate; a payment rate equal to 100 percent of per capita fee-for-service costs in the county in 2004, trended forward to 2008; a payment rate equal to 100 percent of
per capita fee-for-service costs in the county in 2005, trended forward to 2008; or a payment rate equal to 100
percent of per capita fee-for-service costs in the county in 2007, trended forward to 2008. The MMA provides
for the annual minimum increase in MA plan payments to be the higher of: 1) the Medicare national growth-rate
percentage in fee-for-service expenditures; or 2) 2 percent. Given that the projected national growth rate for
2008 was 5.71 percent, payments in all counties were thus increased by at least that amount.
Extra payments to Medicare Advantage plans are calculated for each of the more than 3,000 counties in the
United States in 2008. Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands are not included in the analysis. All calculations are MA plan enrollee-weighted to reflect variations in enrollment and payment rates.
Over 300,000 MA enrollees are in Medicare “cost” plans, paid on the basis of costs. Although these beneficiaries (identified through the CMS Medicare Advantage State/County/Contract data file for February 2008)
receive Medicare benefits through managed care plans, they do not generate extra payments based on MA plan
payment rates.iii Cost beneficiaries were removed from the Medicare Advantage enrollee totals by county but are
included in the number of overall Medicare beneficiaries.
This analysis follows a methodological convention developed by the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission
(MedPAC) in addressing the Medicare policy of making direct payments to teaching hospitals for the costs of
indirect medical education (IME) for MA enrollees. MedPAC adjusts fee-for-service costs at the county level by
removing the average IME expense. This is done by deflating the county fee-for-service average by a factor of
1–(0.65 x GME), where GME is the county graduate medical education carve-out and 0.65 represents the
national average percentage of GME payments that goes to IME; county-specific data are unavailable. Because
Medicare makes IME payments directly to teaching hospitals for patients who are enrolled in Medicare Advantage,
MA plan payment rates are most appropriately compared with fee-for-service costs adjusted in this manner.iv
Budget-neutral risk adjustments to 2008 payments to Medicare Advantage plans provide additional extra payments
to MA plans. This analysis of extra payments includes a budget-neutral risk adjustment of 1.0169 for 2008.v
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Notes to Study Methods
i

Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Rate Calculation Data Risk 2008 spreadsheet (Baltimore, Md.: CMS,
Apr. 2007), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/.

ii

Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Medicare Advantage State/County/Contract Data (Baltimore, Md.: CMS,
Feb. 2008), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MCRAdvPartDEnrolData/; Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, Medicare Managed Care Quarterly State County Data (Baltimore, Md.: CMS, Dec. 2005), available at http://
www.cms.hhs.gov/HealthPlanRepFileData/.

iii

Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Medicare Advantage State/County/Contract Data (Baltimore, Md.: CMS,
Feb. 2008), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MCRAdvPartDEnrolData/.

iv

Alternatively, indirect medical education amounts may be added to Medicare Advantage payment rates, and these
adjusted rates are directly compared with published fee-for-service spending averages. The two methods have extremely
similar results.

v

Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, “Note to: All Medicare Advantage Organizations and Other Interested
Parties: Announcement of Calendar Year (CY) 2008 Medicare Advantage Capitation Rates and Payment Policies”
(Baltimore, Md.: CMS, Apr. 2007), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/.

Note: This brief’s analysis for the years 2004–2007 utilizes the same methods described above. Enrollment and
beneficiary totals are from December of each year.
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